
BJMB! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Brazilian(Journal(of(Motor(Behavior(
(
https://doi.org/10.20338/bjmb.v17i6.411
Special issue:
“In memory of Michael Turvey”
graduate seminar by the same name for over 23 years.
A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE: EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED
It may surprise the reader, then, to hear that I am not going to focus on dynamics itself as Michael's central influence on my
career. Instead, I think that his greatest influence was the adoption of a systems perspective. In the search for an explanation for
behavior, a systems perspective considers everything—both contemporaneous and historical influences—that might influence the
phenomenon of interest. I explain it to students as drawing a circle around everything that might possibly play a role in producing that
phenomenon. Ecological psychology's emphasis on the organism embedded in its environment is necessarily a systems perspective.
Let us first consider contemporaneous influences. Whenever I teach dynamical systems to graduate or undergraduate
students, I start with a lecture entitled Everything is Connected. As you sit in your chair reading this, lift the leg that sits on the same side
as your writing hand and draw circles in a clockwise direction as if you were tracing them in sand on the ground. Now draw a big number
6 in the air with your preferred hand. What happens? Your leg reverses direction and starts to move counter-clockwise. Despite being
distally related, located at different ends of our bodies, our limbs are connected; they influence each other and cannot move at will in
opposite directions without sufficient practice. This was Bernstein's context conditioned variability
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. Every movement occurs in—and its
outcome is dependent upon—context. Bernstein goes on to explain in his explanation of the degrees of freedom problem the impossibility
and unnecessary computational burden of considering the control of movements in isolation, apart from context
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. Behavior, after all,
never occurs in isolation.
Bernstein
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emphasized the role of given forces in the control of bodily movements: we can either consider commands that work
in a vacuum, building an intended movement from scratch, or supplement given dynamics, for example, gravity and springlike properties
of muscles, to solve a much easier problem. If we harness the given dynamics, molding them to our will, then we are working with the
natural dynamics of a system and do not have to build it up from scratch - which, because the given forces will still be there - won't work.
Thelen and colleagues
10,11
induced stepping and walking behavior in babies by providing the context in which those behaviors could
emerge. They induced stepping behavior in infants as young as three months old by submerging their lower bodies in water to lessen the
impact of baby fat. They encouraged slightly older babies who could not yet walk on their own to demonstrate walking behavior on a
treadmill where the springlike forces in the muscles produce the leg swing that is characteristic of walking. In the spirit of this research, I
ask my own students whether they are walkers or crawlers... and then I show them a picture of a steep slope that they might be asked to
climb. In context, even grown adults capable of walking necessarily become crawlers. To quote Alicia Juarrero
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in her latest book,
Context Changes Everything: How constraints create coherence.
We acknowledge the importance of context in ecological psychology when we take as foundational the inseparability of
organism and environment. Classically, from Gibson
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, we know that direct perception is facilitated by the preservation of the organism-
environment relationship. Meaning exists in the relation between organism and environment, with no primacy given to either the organism
or environment alone. As we all learned in Michael's Perception class, preserved for posterity in Turvey's
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Lectures on Perception: An
Ecological Perspective, if we separate the organism from the environment by considering the retinal image as the point of division, then
we face the insurmountable task of adding meaning back into that impoverished point of contact. This is not a new idea: Our scientific
tradition inherits from Descartes a division not just of mind and body but of subject and object
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. If we as subjects are separate from the
objects that we wish to consider in our surrounding world, then we face the tremendous task of explaining how to stitch the two back
together.
Scientists who dichotomize nature and nurture face similar battles. In his book, The Dependent Gene, Moore
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addresses
causality using memorable examples of the inseparability of gene and environment. One of my favorites is the example of chicks with
teeth. Wait, you say, chicks don't have teeth... but they do in context! A chick's beak develops out of a particular layer of embryonic
tissue; Moore conveniently labels it Layer 1. If mouse cells are transplanted into the layer behind that beak-developing layer, into what
might be labeled Layer 2, then the cells in Layer 1, still the chick cells, develop into teeth. It isn't those Layer 1 cells that contain the
information about the structure that emerges but the cells in Layer 1 plus the environment of Layer 2 that constrain what emerges. One
does not take primacy over the other.
The previous examples are limited to contemporaneous context, but behavior similarly occurs in historical context. As
scientists, we have inherited a tendency to look for (Aristotle's) efficient cause
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, a type of causality that has been likened to a "billiard
ball" effect, where we look for some event that immediately preceded the behavior that we are trying to explain. That is a limited view of
history. In fact, most behaviors are multiply-caused by events both proximal and distal to the observed behavior. What caused you to
start reading this article? Was it that you saw it in your email? Was it a future-oriented goal, that you hoped to learn something? Was it
oriented further in the past, that you hoped to read something that reminded you of your own interactions with Michael Turvey? We know
from the immense literature on long-range correlations
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that it is not just the immediately preceding event that is correlated with the
present. Autocorrelations of a value greater than one are the more likely case, with events correlated across both proximal and distal
points in time.